what economic factors lead nations to fight each other
BMJ. 2002 Feb 9; 324(7333): 342–345.
Root causes of vehement conflict in developing countries
Poverty and political, social, and economic inequalities between groups predispose to conflict; policies to tackle them will reduce this risk
Eight out of 10 of the globe's poorest countries are suffering, or have recently suffered, from big scale violent conflict. Wars in developing countries have heavy human, economic, and social costs and are a major cause of poverty and underdevelopment. The extra infant deaths caused by the war in Cambodia, for example, were estimated to be three% of the country's 1990 population.1 Most current conflicts, such as in the Sudan or the Congo, are within states, although there is often considerable outside intervention, as in Transitional islamic state of afghanistan. In the by 30 years Africa has been especially desperately afflicted by war (see fig 1).
Number of armed conflicts by level, 1946–2000. (Adapted from Gleditsch NP, Wallensteen P, Eriksson Yard, Sollenberg M, Strand H. Armed conflict 1946-2000: a new dataset. www.pcr.uu.se/workpapers.html)
This article reviews the evidence on the root causes of disharmonize and suggests some policy responses that should exist adopted to reduce the likelihood of future war.
The cultural dimension of war
Many groups of people who fight together perceive themselves as belonging to a common culture (indigenous or religious), and office of the reason that they are fighting may exist to maintain their cultural autonomy. For this reason, at that place is a trend to attribute wars to "primordial" ethnic passions, which makes them seem intractable. This view is not correct, all the same, and diverts attention from important underlying economic and political factors.
Although a person'due south culture is partly inherited it is besides synthetic and chosen, and many people have multiple identities.2 Many of the ethnic identities in Africa that today seem to be so strong were "invented" by the colonial powers for administrative purposes and have but weak origins in precolonial Africa.iii Their boundaries are by and large fluid, and they accept rightly been described equally "fuzzy sets."iv
In wars political leaders may deliberately "rework historical memories" to engender or strengthen this identity in the competition for power and resource. For example, in the conflict in Matebeland in postal service-independence Zimbabwe, Ndebele identity was used to advance political objectives.5 Other well known examples include the Nazis in Germany, the Hutus in Rwanda (fig ii), and, today, the emphasis on Muslim consciousness past the Taliban and others.
Victims of a massacre by Hutus in Rwanda
Economic factors which predispose to war
Four economic hypotheses have been put forward to explain intra-state wars, based on factors related to grouping motivation, private motivation, failure of the social contract, and environmental degradation.
Group motivation hypothesis—Since intra-land wars mainly consist of fighting betwixt groups, grouping motives, resentments, and ambitions provide motivation for state of war.4 ,6 ,vii Groups may be divided along cultural or religious lines, by geography, or past class. Group differences but become worth fighting for, notwithstanding, if at that place are other of import differences betwixt groups, particularly in the distribution and exercise of political and economic ability.8 In this situation relatively deprived groups are likely to seek (or exist persuaded by their leaders to seek) redress. Where political redress is non possible they may resort to war. Resentments inspired by group differences, termed horizontal inequalities, are a major cause of war. These grouping differences have many dimensions—economic, political, and social (encounter tabular array ). Relatively privileged groups may also be motivated to fight to protect their privileges confronting attack from relatively deprived groups.6
Private motivation hypothesis—State of war confers benefits on individuals besides as costs which tin can motivate people to fight.9 ,10 Young uneducated men, in particular, may gain employment every bit soldiers. War also generates opportunities to boodle, profiteer from shortages and from help, trade arms, and carry out illicit production and trade in drugs, diamonds, timber, and other bolt. Where alternative opportunities are few, because of low incomes and poor employment, and the possibilities of enrichment by war are considerable, the incidence and duration of wars are likely to be greater. This "greed hypothesis" has its base in rational choice economic science.10 ,xi
Failure of the social contract—This derives from the view that social stability is based on a hypothetical social contract between the people and the regime. People accept state authority then long as the land delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions (employment and incomes). With economical stagnation or decline, and worsening country services, the social contract breaks downwardly, and violence results. Hence loftier and rising levels of poverty and a refuse in state services would exist expected to cause conflict.12
Greenish war hypothesis—This points to environmental deposition as a source of poverty and cause of conflict.13 ,xiv For example, rising population force per unit area and falling agricultural productivity may pb to state disputes. Growing scarcity of h2o may provoke conflict.15 This hypothesis contradicts the view that people fight to secure command over environmental riches.ten ,16
The four hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. For example, the disharmonize in the Sudan is an example of both horizontal inequality (with people in the south being heavily deprived) and powerful private gains that perpetuate the struggle.9 While environmental poverty has plausibly been an important factor in the conflict in Rwanda, it does non seem to have been in the former Yugoslavia.
The evidence underpinning the hypotheses
Bear witness from case studies and statistical analyses advise that each hypothesis has something to contribute to explaining conflict.
Group inequality—There is consistent show of sharp horizontal inequalities between groups in conflict.17 Group inequalities in political access are invariably observed—hence the resort to violence rather than seeking to resolve differences through political negotiation. Grouping inequalities in economic dimensions are common, although not invariably large (such as in Bosnia18). Horizontal inequalities are about likely to lead to conflict where they are substantial, consequent, and increasing over time. Although systematic cross country evidence is rare, one report classified 233 politicised communal groups in 93 countries according to political, economic, and ecological differences and plant that most groups suffering horizontal inequalities had taken some action to assert group interests, ranging from non-vehement protest to rebellion.iv
Individual motivation—The view that individual motivation plays an of import role in prolonging, if not causing, conflict in some countries is well supported by work in the Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.9 ,nineteen ,20 Collier and Hoeffler tested the greed hypothesis (albeit with a rather rough measure of resource riches) and constitute a meaning association with conflict, although this has been challenged.21 They as well found that greater male person education to higher secondary level reduced the run a risk of war. They concluded that "greed" outperforms grievance in explaining disharmonize.
Failure of the social contract—Econometric studies show that the incidence of conflict is higher amid countries with low per capita incomes, life expectancy, and economic growth.10 ,12 ,22 Notwithstanding, many statistical investigations of the association between vertical income distribution and conflict produce differing results.10 ,12 ,23 It has been suggested that funding programmes from the International Monetary Fund—commonly associated with cuts in regime services—crusade conflicts, but neither statistical nor instance study evidence supports this, perhaps because countries on the verge of conflict do not generally qualify for such programmes.12 ,24
Light-green war hypothesis—Here the evidence is contradictory. It seems that both environmental poverty and resource riches can exist associated with disharmonize.xiii ,16 ,25 Environmental stress tends to brand people decumbent to violence equally they seek alternatives to desperate situations (as in Rwanda), while resource riches give strong motivation to detail groups to gain control over such resources (equally in Sierra Leone).
Although none of the four hypotheses solely explains all conflicts, they do place factors likely to predispose groups to conflict. Clearly some explanations agree in some situations and not in others, just one gene that all studies have constitute to be important is a history of conflict. This is because the same structural factors that predisposed to war initially often keep, and because mobilising people by calling on grouping memories is more than effective if there is a history of conflict.
Policies to reduce the likelihood of war
The enquiry summarised above suggests some important policy conclusions for conflict-prone countries. One is that policies to tackle poverty and ecology degradation will reduce the likelihood of war, too every bit being critical development objectives. Reducing large horizontal inequalities is essential to eliminate a major source of conflict. Policies that diminish individual incentives to fight, especially one time conflict is under manner, are too needed. Above all, there is a need to secure inclusive government—from political, economical, and social perspectives—and a flourishing economy so that all major groups and well-nigh individuals gain from participation in the normal economy.
From a political perspective, inclusive regime is non simply a matter of democracy; majority based commonwealth tin lead to oppression of minorities. Conflict is greatest in semi-democracies or governments in transition and least among established democracies and authoritarian regimes.26 Democratic institutions must be inclusive at all levels—for example, voting systems should ensure that all major groups are represented in regime. The contempo constitution adopted for government in Northern Republic of ireland and the proposals for Afghanistan and Burundi are examples of this.
Economical and social policies are needed to systematically reduce horizontal inequalities. Policies towards investment, employment, education, and other social services should aim at reducing imbalances and inequalities. Such policies demand to be introduced charily since action to correct horizontal inequalities has occasionally provoked disharmonize past the group whose privileged position is beingness weakened, notably in Sri Lanka.
A major problem is that the government of a conflict-prone country may resist such action, since it may be the beneficiary of the imbalances. Exterior agencies tin point to the need to reduce horizontal inequalities, just ultimately such policies must depend on domestic actors.
In the short term, policies to change individual incentives to fight include providing employment schemes and credit to young men. In the longer term, extending educational activity and achieving inclusive evolution volition enhance peacetime opportunities. Better control and legitimacy of international markets in drugs, timber, diamonds, etc, should reduce opportunities to profit from illegal trade during war.
Conclusion
Although this article has concentrated on the causes of conflict inside countries, much of the analysis is relevant to the international situation. The sharp economical and social differences betwixt Western societies and the Muslim world are a clear example of international horizontal inequalities. These, together with the widespread impoverishment in many Muslim countries, permit leaders such equally Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein to mobilise support merely too finer along religious lines.
Table
Examples of horizontal inequality
| Categories of differentiation | Selected examples |
|---|---|
| Political participation | |
| Participation in government | Fiji, Burundi, Bosnia and Herzogovinia, Republic of uganda, Sri Lanka |
| Membership of army and police | Fiji, Northern Ireland, Republic of burundi, Kosova |
| Economic power | |
| Avails: | |
| Country | Republic of the fiji islands, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti |
| Privately owned capital letter | Malaysia, Due south Africa, Burundi |
| Government infrastructure | Chiapas, Mexico, Republic of burundi |
| Aid | Afghanistan, Sudan, Rwanda |
| Natural resources | Liberia, Sierra Leone |
| Employment and incomes: | |
| Incomes | Malaysia, S Africa, Fiji, Chiapas |
| Government employment | Sri Lanka, Fiji |
| Private employment | Fiji, Republic of uganda, Malaysia |
| Elite employment | South Africa, Fiji, Northern Republic of ireland |
| Unemployment | Due south Africa, Northern Ireland |
| Social access and situation | |
| Instruction | Rwanda, Burundi, Haiti, S Africa, Northern Uganda, Kosova |
| Health services | Burundi, Northern Uganda, Chiapas |
| Safe drinking h2o | Uganda, Chiapas |
| Housing | Northern Ireland |
| Poverty | Chiapas, Uganda, South Africa |
Acknowledgments
I give thanks the editor and two referees for their helpful comments.
Footnotes
Competing interests: None declared.
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2002 Feb nine; 324 (7333) : 342–345.
Commentary: Conflict—from causes to prevention?
Douglas Holdstock
one-1001Medact, 601 Holloway Road, London N19 4DJ, 1-1002Medipaz, Apdo Postal P-191, Managua 2, Nicaragua
Antonio Jarquin
1-1001Medact, 601 Holloway Route, London N19 4DJ, ane-1002Medipaz, Apdo Postal P-191, Managua 2, Nicaragua
Modern war is not an expression of innate aggression but an economic and social construction.1-ane It is an effort to settle, by violence, disputes over political power, territorial and ethnic issues, and societal stresses such equally injustice and poverty. Information technology is vital to address the roots of conflict. It is equally important to reduce the supply of arms, particularly to developing countries, as virtually all of the approximately thirty currently active conflicts are in less developed countries,i-2 which, every bit Stewart notes, comport the main brunt of deaths from war. According to the United nations Development Programme, global military spending has fallen from a cold war elevation of about $one trillion (£709 million meg) to around $750bn in 2000.
Treaties to regulate weapons (principally of mass devastation) do exist,1-3 merely they demand to be ratified by all UN members states, which should allow total scope for verification. It is regrettable that the United states is obstructing verification of the Biological Weapons Convention. Conflicts in developing countries are fought with conventional weapons, specially small-scale arms, which are recycled from i conflict to another and are light and simple to handle, even past children. The United nations is attempting to curb the illicit merchandise in pocket-size arms, and a more than radical treaty to limit arms transfers is existence promoted past non-governmental organisations such equally Oxfam. Destruction of arms should follow the end of disharmonize, and this could exist facilitated past offering combatants retraining in exchange for arms.i-4
Stewart emphasises the importance of a history of conflict and comments that structural factors predisposing to war may persist. Just many conflicts in developing countries—such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua—began as cold war proxies. The European Marriage has made state of war between its members effectively unthinkable. Similar bodies, such as the Arrangement for African Unity and others in Asia and Latin America, are developing and are likely to promote like cohesion. Free dialogue between such groups at all levels is vital to reduce the very real risk of them becoming opposing "superstates" with an indigenous or religious basis.
To play its intended office—to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"—the Un must be reformed and strengthened. Member states must not undertake military action without UN authorisation; its role should not be confined to picking up the pieces later on disharmonize.1-5 Eradication of war will non be piece of cake but can be accomplished piecemeal over fourth dimension, and health workers have a central function.1-6 There is a medical model—the emptying of smallpox and soon of polio past surveillance, treatment, and preventive measures—for turning a vision into reality.
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Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1122271/
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